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Imports are closely related to economic growth. When the economy grows rapidly, 
we buy more of everything, including goods and services imported from abroad. In 
recent years, the demand for imports created by a rapidly growing U.S. economy 
has provided an important boost to growth for many U.S. trading partners. 
Between 1994 and 2007, for example, as U.S. GDP grew by $6.8 trillion, U.S. 
imports increased by more than $1.5 trillion (on a U.S. dollar basis). 
  
The link, however, also works in the other direction. If countries exporting to the 
United States benefit from the rapid growth of the U.S. economy, these same 
countries stand to be hurt by a period of slow growth or recession. A slower 
growing, or shrinking, U.S. economy implies less demand for the exports of our 
trading partners. This can lead, in turn, to slower growth or even a recession for our 
trading partners. 
 
This paper examines the impact that a slower rate of growth in the United States 
due to the coming (or current) recession, in conjunction with an unavoidable 
longer-term adjustment in our trade deficit, is likely to have on the economies of 
U.S. trading partners in the Western Hemisphere. The slowdown in the United 
States is likely to contribute to a reduction in the size of the U.S. trade deficit to a 
level that is closer to what can be sustained over the long-run, leading, among other 
effects, to a reduction in U.S. imports. The trade deficits of recent years, which 
peaked at 5.8 percent of GDP in 2006, clearly cannot be sustained over the long-
run, and the coming recession is likely to accelerate the inevitable adjustment 
process.  
 
Deficits of this magnitude have led to the rapid growth in the net foreign 
indebtedness of the United States. The country’s net indebtedness stood at $2.6 
trillion, or 19.7 percent of GDP, at the end of 2006.1 The 2007 trade deficit will 
raise this figure substantially.2 Persistent trade deficits of this magnitude would lead 
to an explosive foreign debt-to-GDP ratio. As this ratio starts to reach high levels, 
investors would likely demand an interest rate premium to invest in the United 
States in order to protect themselves against a depreciation of the dollar. Higher 
interest rates would then add to the current account deficit, which in turn would 
make the debt grow even faster, leading to an even higher interest rate premium. 
* Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director, John Schmitt is a Senior Economist and Luis Sandoval is a Research Assistant at 
the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC.
                                                 
1 See Box 1: U.S. Foreign Debt. 
2 Data on the net investment position of the United States were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), New 
Release “U.S. International Investment Position, 2006,” available at the BEA website: 
[http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm ].   
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Presumably, the trade deficit will fall back to a sustainable level before the United States starts approaching 
this debt-and-interest rate spiral. The calculations in this paper assume that the trade adjustment, which 
may have already begun, takes place by the year 2010. In a low-adjustment scenario, we assume that the 
trade deficit falls from 5.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 3.0 percent of GDP in 2010. A trade deficit of this 
size would imply that the ratio of debt to GDP would still rise, but at a much slower pace than the 
increases in recent years. In a high adjustment scenario, we assume that the trade deficit falls back to 1.0 
percent of GDP by 2010. Depending on the relative returns of U.S. investments abroad and foreign 
investments in the United States, this trade deficit could still be associated with a rising ratio of foreign 
debt to GDP; however the rate of increase would certainly be slow. (The appendix provides a full 
explanation for the calculations in the paper.)  
 
Box 1: U.S. Foreign Debt 
 
As would be expected, persistent trade deficits led to a sharp increase in U.S. net foreign 
indebtedness as a percent of GDP through 2001. However, between 2001 and 2006, U.S. net 
foreign indebtedness as a percent of GDP barely increased, despite large and growing trade 
and current account deficits. The unchanged level of net foreign indebtedness mainly 
reflected changes in the valuation of U.S. assets held by foreigners relative to the foreign 
assets held by U.S. residents. A sharp decline in the value of the dollar since March 2002 (it 
has fallen about 25 percent in real terms against a trade-weighted basket of currencies and 
even more against currencies where the bulk of U.S. investment is located) has substantially 
raised the dollar value of US assets abroad, a large share of which is in equities denominated 
in foreign currencies; while foreigners hold a much greater proportion of their investment in 
the U.S. in bonds and dollar-denominated assets.   
 
Furthermore, the return on foreign assets is higher than the return on U.S. assets. However, 
for a number of reasons, the trends that have kept U.S. net foreign indebtedness from 
increasing in step with U.S. current account deficits over the last five years cannot be 
expected to have this same impact going forward. (See, e.g., Cline, William R., "The United 
States As A Debtor Nation," (2005), Peterson Institute for International Economics: 
[http://bookstore.petersoninstitute.org/book-store/3993.html]). 
 
 
The Relative Importance of Exports to the U.S. Market 
 
Table 1 shows the GDP of the countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, as well 
as their overall exports and exports to the United States,3 with both expressed as a percent of GDP. Some 
countries are much more dependent on the U.S. market than others. For example, 77 percent of Mexico's 
exports go to the U.S. market, and these exports to the United States accounted for approximately 21 
percent of the country's GDP in 2007. Other countries where exports to the U.S. constitute a significant 
percentage of GDP include Honduras (37 percent), Nicaragua (26 percent), Canada (23 percent), and 
several other countries in Central America and the Caribbean.  
 
Most of South America is much less dependent on exports to the United States, partly because these 
countries have less open economies (that is, the sum of imports and exports is a smaller share of these 
                                                 
3 The U.S. export and import data in the table refer to total U.S. imports from and exports to the rest of the world. 
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countries' GDP) and partly because these countries export more to countries other than the United States. 
For example, exports to the United States are only 1.6 percent of Argentina's GDP and 2.9 percent of 
Brazil's GDP. Venezuela's exports to the US are 15 percent of GDP, but 95 percent of that is oil. In the 
calculations that follow, we assume that oil, oil-related and natural gas exports are not reduced as a result 
of the U.S. slowdown. This significantly mitigates the effect of the U.S. slowdown for Canada, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela. 
 
TABLE 1 
Western Hemisphere: Nominal GDP, Total Exports to the World and to the U.S. in 2007 
 Nominal GDP Exports to the U.S. Total Exports 
  (In US$ millions) (In % of GDP) (In % of GDP) 
Argentina 248,332 1.6                21.4 
Bahamas, The 6,586 6.8                30.3 
Barbados 3,739 0.9                  8.4 
Belize 1,304 7.8                29.0 
Bolivia 12,710 2.4                28.2 
Brazil 1,295,355 1.9                12.7 
Canada 1,406,430 23.3                29.4 
Chile 160,784 5.5                41.8 
Colombia 171,738 5.1                16.3 
Costa Rica 22,842 17.0                66.5 
Dominica 268 0.6                40.5 
Dominican Republic 35,494 11.1                16.6 
Ecuador 44,528 13.1                30.7 
El Salvador 20,234 9.6                20.1 
Grenada 553 1.7                  9.1 
Guatemala 33,320 9.2                22.8 
Guyana 978 12.5                78.6 
Haiti 5,295 8.6                11.5 
Honduras 10,059 37.0                53.8 
Jamaica 10,737 6.7                19.9 
Mexico 886,441 21.4                27.8 
Nicaragua 5,675 25.7                42.7 
Panama 19,280 1.7                  8.9 
Paraguay 10,347 0.6                25.2 
Peru 101,504 4.8                26.0 
St. Kitts and Nevis 520 10.7                18.7 
St. Lucia 958 1.7                13.1 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 528 0.3                32.6 
Suriname 2,234 5.6                65.1 
Trinidad and Tobago 20,703 41.3                68.5 
Uruguay 21,171 2.5                22.5 
Venezuela 226,922 15.0                34.9 
  
 Nominal GDP Total U.S. imports Total U.S. exports 
 (In US$ millions) (In % of GDP) (In % of GDP) 
United States  13,843,000 17.0 11.9 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2007; IMF, Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS); Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts. 
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Small Adjustment Scenario 
 
Table 2 shows the projected changes in non-oil exports (that is, excluding oil, oil-related and natural gas 
exports, as described earlier) to the United States associated with a reduction in the size of the U.S. trade 
deficit to 3.0 percent of GDP by 2010. The table presents the impact as both a share of each country's 
total exports and as a share of each country's total GDP, under the assumption that the decline in exports 
to the United States is shared equally across the countries in proportion to their current shares of total U.S. 
non-oil and non-gas imports. 
 
TABLE 2 
Small Decline In U.S. Trade Deficit 
 
Projected Reduction in Exports 
to the United States 
 (% of GDP) (% of Exports) 
Argentina 0.2 0.8 
Bahamas, The 0.7 2.4 
Barbados 0.1 1.8 
Belize 1.1 3.8 
Bolivia 0.3 1.1 
Brazil 0.2 2.0 
Canada 2.8 9.5 
Chile 0.9 2.1 
Colombia 0.4 2.3 
Costa Rica 2.7 4.1 
Dominica 0.1 0.2 
Dominican Republic 1.8 10.7 
Ecuador 0.6 1.9 
El Salvador 1.5 7.6 
Grenada 0.3 3.0 
Guatemala 1.4 6.0 
Guyana 2.0 2.5 
Haiti 1.4 11.9 
Honduras 5.9 11.0 
Jamaica 1.1 5.4 
Mexico 2.9 10.4 
Nicaragua 4.1 9.6 
Panama 0.3 3.1 
Paraguay 0.1 0.4 
Peru 0.6 2.5 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1.7 9.1 
St. Lucia 0.3 2.1 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0 0.1 
Suriname 0.9 1.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.3 3.3 
Uruguay 0.4 1.7 
Venezuela 0.1 0.3 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2007; IMF, Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS); U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb; and authors’ 
calculations. 
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The most affected countries are those where exports constitute a higher share of national GDP and where 
exports to the United States represent a larger share of total national exports. As a result, our calculations 
suggest that Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and Canada will suffer most as a result of any 
recession-induced downturn in U.S. imports. Mexico would see a 10.4 percent decline in its total exports, 
which implies a 2.9 percent decline in its GDP relative to a scenario where U.S. imports remained 
unchanged. Canadian exports would fall 9.5 percentage points, translating to a 2.8 percent decline in GDP. 
The proportional impact on Honduras and Nicaragua would be even larger, with exports dropping  11.0 
percent in Honduras and 9.6 percent in Nicaragua. These correspond to a 5.9 percent decline in GDP in 
the case of Honduras and 4.1 percent of GDP fall in the case of Nicaragua.  
 
By comparison, the average annual rate of real GDP growth for Latin America from 1980-2007 was 2.5 
percent. These projections imply that, even in a low-adjustment scenario where the U.S. trade deficit only 
falls to 3.0 percent of GDP, the loss of demand from exports to the United States would be 
proportionately 1.2 times as large in Mexico and nearly 2.4 times as large in Honduras as this average 
annual growth rate for the region. Declines in exports of this magnitude would undoubtedly lead to 
substantial economic disruptions.  
 
A decline in U.S. imports would have much less impact on the countries in South America. In this region, 
Chile would feel the biggest effect, with a drop in exports of 2.1 percent or about  0.9 percent of GDP. 
The drop in exports for both Brazil (down 2.0 percent) and Argentina (down 0.8 percent) would be equal 
to just 0.2 percent of each country's GDP. 
 
Large Adjustment Scenario 
 
Table 3 shows the projected changes in non-oil and non-gas exports to the United States in the case of a 
large trade adjustment associated with a reduction in the size of the U.S. trade deficit to 1.0 percent of 
GDP by 2010. 
  
Since all of the adjustments are assumed to be proportionate, the relative impacts across countries do not 
change. In the large adjustment scenario, the decline in Mexico’s exports would be equal to 14.6 percent of 
total exports or about 4.1 percent of its GDP. For Canada, exports would shrink by 13.5 percent, for a 4.0 
percent decline in overall GDP. The reduction in exports to the United States would be 15.5 percent in the 
case of Honduras and 13.5 percent for Nicaragua, or 8.3 percent of Honduras's total GDP and 5.8 percent 
of Nicaragua's total GDP. 
 
Using the average annual growth rate in Latin America and the Caribbean as a metric once again, in this 
large-adjustment scenario, the reduction in Mexico’s exports to the United States is nearly 1.6 times as 
large relative to Mexico’s GDP as the average annual growth rate for Latin America and the Caribbean 
over the years from 1980-2007. The loss of exports for Nicaragua would be nearly 2.3 times as large, 
relative to the size of its economy and for Honduras, more than 3.3 times as large. A reduction in exports 
of this magnitude will clearly have a substantial impact on these economies. 
  
In this large-adjustment scenario, the decline in exports to the United States would be equal to 2.9 percent 
of Chile's total exports or about 1.2 percent of the country's GDP. As a share of total exports, the 
calculations suggest that exports would fall about 1.1 percent in Argentina (or about 0.2 percent of the 
country’s GDP) and about 2.8 percent in Brazil (or about 0.4 percent of the country’s GDP). 
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TABLE 3 
Large Decline In U.S. Trade Deficit 
 
Projected Reduction in Exports to 
the United States
 (% of GDP) (% of Exports) 
Argentina 0.2 1.1
Bahamas, The 1.0 3.4
Barbados 0.2 2.5
Belize 1.5 5.3
Bolivia 0.5 1.6
Brazil 0.4 2.8
Canada 4.0 13.5
Chile 1.2 2.9
Colombia 0.5 3.2
Costa Rica 3.8 5.7
Dominica 0.1 0.4
Dominican Republic 2.5 15.1
Ecuador 0.8 2.7
El Salvador 2.2 10.7
Grenada 0.4 4.3
Guatemala 1.9 8.5
Guyana 2.8 3.6
Haiti 1.9 16.8
Honduras 8.3 15.5
Jamaica 1.5 7.7
Mexico 4.1 14.6
Nicaragua 5.8 13.5
Panama 0.4 4.4
Paraguay 0.1 0.6
Peru 0.9 3.5
St. Kitts and Nevis 2.4 12.9
St. Lucia 0.4 2.9
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 0.2
Suriname 1.3 1.9
Trinidad and Tobago 3.2 4.7
Uruguay 0.5 2.4
Venezuela 0.2 0.5
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO), October 2007; IMF, Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS); U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb; and authors’ 
calculations. 
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Conclusion 
 
The United States is currently running a trade deficit that virtually all economists recognize to be 
unsustainable. At some point, the United States will have to move towards a more sustainable situation, 
which implies increased exports and reduced imports. An economic recession such as the one that the U.S. 
economy appears to be entering now is likely to play a role in that adjustment process. Plausible estimates 
suggest that any such adjustment process is likely to have a substantial impact on the economies of the 
U.S. trading partners, especially Canada, Mexico, and the countries in the Caribbean and Central America. 
The reduction in exports from these countries to the United States will be large relative to the size of their 
economies. Unless declines in these exports are offset by some other source of demand, in the worst case, 
the falloff in exports to the United States could be sufficient to push some economies into recessions of 
their own. Growth in both Canada and Mexico, for example, slowed sharply in 2001, during the last U.S. 
recession, with real GDP growth in Mexico slipping to zero for that year. The last U.S. recession was 
relatively short (March to November 2001) and mild in terms of lost output. The next (possibly current) 
recession in the United States will likely be worse.4  
The countries that will likely suffer most as the result of a reduction in U.S. imports are the same countries 
with which the United States has implemented “free trade” agreements in recent decades, including the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and 
the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, DR-CAFTA, which includes the United 
States along with Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. 
Meanwhile, countries that are less dependent on the United States, or more reliant on domestic demand, 
will see smaller impacts of the U.S. recession on their exports and national GDP. 
Our estimates do not address other important channels through which a U.S. recession would affect the 
rest of the hemisphere. One of these channels is remittances sent home by foreign nationals working in 
the United States. Remittances form a large part of a number of economies:  Haiti (31 percent), Nicaragua 
(17 percent), El Salvador (16 percent), Jamaica (16 percent), and Guatemala (11 percent).5 Although not all 
of this money comes from the United States, most of it does. A second possible transmission channel that 
we do not consider in this report is that this particular economic slowdown in the United States is 
connected to a credit crunch brought on by the collapse of the market for mortgage-backed securities. The 
extent and duration of the resulting problems in the international financial system, and their impact on 
other countries in this hemisphere, are not yet clear, but further negative impacts are likely.  
 
However, these other effects are difficult to predict. The impact of a U.S. recession on its import market, 
and the resulting impact on the rest of the hemisphere, is much more straightforward, although the timing 
and pace of such an adjustment are still uncertain.
                                                 
4 See John Schmitt and Dean Baker (2008), “What We’re In For: Projected Economic Impact of the Next Recession,” Center 
for Economic and Policy Research: [http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/JSDB_08recession.pdf]. 
5 Multilateral Investment Fund, “Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean (2006),” online at: 
[http://www.iadb.org/mif/remittances]. 
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Appendix 
 
The calculations in Tables 2 and 3 assume a trend rate of real growth of 2 percent annually for US GDP 
and imports, and 4 percent annual real growth for GDP and overall exports in other countries for the 
three years 2008-2010. To the extent that the recession reflects a decline in consumption associated with 
declines in U.S. house prices, the 2 percent growth rate for U.S. imports may well be optimistic. The 
narrowing of the U.S trade deficit is assumed to take place equally through an increase in exports and 
decrease in imports. For example, in the low adjustment scenario, the U.S. trade deficit shrinks from 5.2 
percent of GDP to 3.0 percent of GDP, which implies a 1.1 percent of GDP (half of 2.2 percent) 
reduction of U.S. imports against the level implied by the (2 percent annual) trend rate of growth. The data 
for U.S. GDP and export and imports are taken from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Income 
and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.5.  
 
This reduction of U.S. imports is assumed to take place only in non-oil and non-gas imports. For the 
countries exporting to the United States, their non-oil (and for Canada, also non-gas) exports to the United 
States are assumed to be reduced by the same proportion in all countries. This reduction in exports to the 
United States is, as above, a reduction from a baseline of 2 percent annual growth. 
 
